Summary Judgment Orders From September

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as an ophthalmologist from September 2016 to February 2019, at which time she was terminated for allegedly having a negative attitude at work and discussing patient information publicly. Less than three months before her termination, she had written a letter detailing her experiences of gender discrimination. The magistrate judge recommended denial of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of gender and race/national origin discrimination because she provided comparator evidence, evidence of discriminatory comments made by the decisionmaker that showed pretext, and a suspect time sequence. The District Court departed from the R&R in response to Plaintiff’s objection regarding one statement by the decisionmaker. It held that “once we get rid of Dr. Reddy, we will never hire another female surgeon. They’re too much trouble” was direct evidence of discrimination.

Regarding Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the Court held that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by saying that she felt she was held to a double standard as a woman and writing the letter concerning discrimination. As she was terminated only three months after sending the letter and the decisionmaker made discriminatory comments, the Court held that Defendant’s reasons for terminating Plaintiff were pretextual.

The District Court adopted the R&R and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff is an African American female. In 2015, as a result of a reorganization plan and workforce reduction policy (and down-leveling of some employees), Plaintiff and three male senior managers were grouped together, as they had similar skills and held similar positions. The workforce reduction committee reviewed the four senior managers’ factor scores and past performance ratings, pursuant to the reduction in force policy. Bryant McKee, and African American male, had the highest score and was transferred to a different role in a different program. John Strickland, a Caucasian male, received the next best score and took over the new consolidated senior manager position. Bryan Batt, a Caucasian male, received the third best score, and was reclassified into a different position. Plaintiff received the lowest score and was identified for layoff. Ultimately, however, she was given the option to select a down-leveled position. Plaintiff chose the down-leveled, lower-level manager position.

The Court decided to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment because, while Plaintiff easily established a prima facie case of discrimination, she was unable to show that Defendant’s legitimate reason for down-leveling her was pretext for discrimination. In fact, she failed to provide evidence showing Defendant’s decision to down-level her was the result of discriminatory animus, and instead focused on arguing that she was more qualified than the person ultimately chosen to take her old position. Additionally, she failed to respond to Defendant’s statement of material facts and consequently, Defendant’s facts were admitted.

Plaintiff was an employee of Georgia Southern University who was terminated for falsifying time records. His termination occurred within a month of him requesting accommodations for his recent amputation, which the University had granted. He filed disability discrimination and retaliation claims against the University. The University filed a motion for summary judgment. Judge Walker recommended summary judgment for the discrimination claim because Plaintiff’s argument that he was treated differently upon his return from leave and was terminated just a few weeks after Southern granted his accommodations were deemed to be mere allegations that were not sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the decisionmakers were operated by discriminatory animus. Judge Walker recommended summary judgment for the retaliation claim, stating that while the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s request for accommodations and his termination was sufficient to show a causal link, his falsified time records were an intervening act that eliminated any inference of causation.

Judge Grimberg agreed with Judge Walker regarding the retaliation claim but disagreed with her as to the discrimination claim. Judge Grimberg stated that the circumstantial evidence presented by Ball showed that GSU’s head football coach failed to either recognize or appreciate Ball’s physical limitations on multiple occasions; Ball’s supervisor kept a record of all the times Ball was unable to do something at work due to his disability; and discussions about Ball’s disability and his accommodations overlapped with discussions about his falsified timesheets. Therefore, he held, it would be reasonable for a jury to infer that, at the very least, the investigation into Ball’s absences began as an investigation into the limitations presented by his disability.

Plaintiff Christen Robinson Kelley, who is African-American, was hired as a Communications Specialist by Defendant Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency (“GEMA”). Her supervisor was Defendant Catherine Howden (“Howden”). Kelley’s non-African-American colleagues had a bigger starting salary and were promoted more quickly than Kelley. In November 2017, Howden told Kelley that her performance was not up to par, and Kelley complained to Howden that she was being treated differently than her peers. In January 2018, Kelley requested a promotion. Instead, the next month, Howden placed Kelley on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). After Kelley filed an EEOC charge and complained internally, she was transferred to a different supervisor and, months later, released from the PIP and given a promotion. Kelley ultimately filed suit, alleging race discrimination in pay and the initial failure to promote, and retaliation for being placed on the PIP shortly after what she argued was protected activity.

GEMA and Howden moved for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand recommended granting summary judgment as to all claims.

Plaintiff filed several objections. First, Judge Ray determined Judge Anand applied the correct standard in determining whether Howden and GEMA’s failure to follow rules was direct evidence of discrimination by considering whether this failure reflects “a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained of by the employee.” Then, in response to Plaintiff’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s finding in a footnote that spoilation did not occur, Judge Ray explained that the Magistrate Judge was simply stating that Plaintiff had passed the deadline to assert the spoilation argument. Judge Ray also overruled Plaintiff’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that there were no similarly situated comparators, because the Magistrate Judge was not limited to just three relevant factors in analyzing whether the comparators are similarly situated in all material respects. Finally, Plaintiff objected to the fact that the Magistrate Judge did not explain why summary judgment should be granted to Defendants on Plaintiff’s mixed-motive claim, but after addressing it within the order, Judge Ray held that Plaintiff had not met her burden.

The Court, therefore, adopted the R&R and granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff, a Dekalb County Firefighter at the time of his employment with Dekalb County, filed suit against his former employer, alleging race discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1981. Defendant, after discovery closed, moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be granted.

Plaintiff was arrested for obstruction and disorderly conduct. Defendant launched an investigation and ultimately terminated Plaintiff because of his actions. The magistrate judge stated that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination, including the showing of a relevant comparator. Defendant argued that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination because Plaintiff’s conduct the night of his arrest warranted termination as opposed to the conduct of the comparator in this case, which Defendant contended did not warrant termination. The magistrate judge found that Defendant had satisfied its burden in showing that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination Plaintiff. Next, Plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s reason for termination was pretextual because (1) there were inconsistencies in the reasons given by Defendant and (2) there were inconsistencies in the application of the employee policies. However, the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion because “[i]n the end, Plaintiff’s argument is nothing more than a dispute with the wisdom or fairness of the Defendant’s decision to terminate his employment, when compared to Defendant’s decision to suspend Smalley [comparator] rather than terminate him.”

The magistrate judge also determined that Plaintiff did not cite to any evidence of a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would suggest that the decisionmaker harbored any discriminatory animus based on Plaintiff’s race. The magistrate judge agreed with Defendant that these statements were based on hearsay and not on Plaintiff’s personal knowledge.

Plaintiff Tamara Baines filed this employment discrimination action on January 15, 2019. All three parties moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants City of Atlanta (the “City”) and Robin Shahar harassed her and discriminated against her because of her sex. The incidents related to Plaintiff’s harassment claims were either done while Plaintiff was not at work or were considered commonplace office events (ex. withdrawing or assignment of work tasks). Thus, the Court held that both Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

She alleged further that the City discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII and the ADA. The Court determined Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies was insufficient, Plaintiff’s charge needed only to lay out the factual bases underpinning their later lawsuit in such a manner that the charge could reasonably be read as asserting the claims brought in the later lawsuit.

The Court stated Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim failed, as she was not entitled to demand the specific accommodation that she wanted, was caught moonlighting in the private practice of law against City rules and was terminated and did not provide proof that she was denied a reasonable accommodation. Thus, summary judgment was appropriate.

As for Plaintiff’s disability discrimination under the ADA and retaliation claims under the ADA, Title VII, and FMLA, the City argued that Plaintiff was terminated due to her moonlighting. Plaintiff argued that a fitness-for-duty clearance was not reasonably job-related and consistent with business necessity, but the Court found the argument meritless. Moreover, the City’s attempt to prevent Plaintiff from returning to work until getting a fitness-for-duty clearance was based on its sincere belief that she had threatened to kill herself.

As for whether the City unlawfully interfered with Plaintiff’s FMLA leave by assigning her work during her leave, the Court found disputed issues of fact precluding summary judgment in the City’s favor. However, the Court determined that her FMLA failure-to-reinstate claims were insufficient, as the City provided independent reasons for her termination.

Finally, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was deemed moot because her ADA claims were otherwise subject to dismissal.

Plaintiff began working for Sheriff Chitwood and was eventually transferred to the CID in 2015, where she worked as an evidence tech on an 8 a.m.-4 p.m. shift. Paul Woods started working for Sheriff Chitwood in 1995 and joined the CID in January 2017. The CID held mandatory morning meetings, and Woods made sexual comments on a near-daily basis at these meetings. Under Chitwood’s anti-harassment policy, employees experiencing discrimination should raise complaints with a supervisor of their choosing. Plaintiff complained to a supervisor on multiple occasions. On one occasion, Woods made a vulgar comment about female genitalia, and Plaintiff told him the comment was not okay. In early 2018, Woods became Captain over the CID. Shortly after he became Captain, Woods also changed Plaintiff’s shift to noon-8 p.m. This shift would not work for Plaintiff because of childcare needs, and Plaintiff eventually resigned because of this hardship. Plaintiff brought four claims against Chitwood in his official capacity under Title VII – constructive discharge, sexually hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation. She also brought a § 1983 Equal Protection claim against Woods individually based on the same allegations.

As to Plaintiff’s sexually hostile work environment claim, the magistrate judge recommended that Defendants’ motion be denied because Woods was motivated by a general hostility towards women in the workplace, Plaintiff was subjectively offended by Woods’s conduct, and a jury could find that her offense was objectively reasonable. Additionally, her complaint to a supervisor imputed knowledge to Chitwood, and he did not take prompt remedial action. The magistrate judge recommended that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s constructive discharge be granted because Plaintiff abandoned the claim. As to Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim concerning the change to the start time of her shift, the magistrate judge recommended that Defendant’s motion be granted because the change was not an adverse employment action. The change in her shift did not substantially alter the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment or deprive her of employment opportunities.

Regarding Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the magistrate judge recommended that Defendants’ motion be denied because her objection to Woods’s particular vulgar comment was protected activity causally connected to the change in her shift start time. Defendants’ proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual. The change in her shift constituted an adverse employment action under the broader standard for retaliation claims. Finally, the magistrate judge recommended that the cross motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Woods for creating a sexually hostile work environment be denied. While the magistrate judge found that Woods was not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment because his actions were potentially outside of his discretionary authority, it should remain an issue for a jury.

Defendant Dekalb Medical Center, Inc. (“DMC”) contracted out its neonatology services to a company called Mednax, which, in turn, employed the neonatologists who worked at DMC, including Plaintiffs Madeline del Portillo (“Dr. del Portillo”) and Bridget Cobb (“Dr. Cobb”). In 2016, DMC threatened to cancel its contract with Mednax unless Mednax removed Plaintiffs and one other female neonatologist from working at DMC, saying “the women must go.” DMC blamed the decision on nurse complaints about Plaintiffs. Mednax did not terminate the Plaintiffs, but they both resigned (after a Mednax-required 90-day notice period). Claiming they were forced to resign (constructive discharge), Drs. Cobb and del Portillo filed suit against DMC, alleging Tortious Interference with their contractual relationship with Mednax, Retaliation in violation of Title VII, Sex Discrimination (constructive discharge) in violation of Title VII, and Sex-Based Hostile Work Environment in violation of Title VII.

DMC moved for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge Alan J. Baverman recommended granting summary judgment as to all claims, and Plaintiffs filed objections. District Judge Clarence Coopergrantedsummary judgment, adopting Judge Baverman’s reasoning with one modification. To wit: Judge Cooper granted summary judgment on the Tortious Interference claim because only “strangers” to the contracts may be liable for Tortious Interference. As a third-party beneficiary to Plaintiffs’ contract with Mednax (receiving the benefit of Plaintiffs providing medical services to DMC’s patients), DMC was not a “stranger” to the contract. Similarly, Judge Cooper granted summary judgment as to Dr. del Portillo’s Retaliation claim because she abandoned it and as to Dr. Cobb’s Retaliation claim because she failed to allege retaliation in her timely EEOC Charge. Finally, Judge Baverman recommended granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ constructive discharge and hostile work environment claims because Plaintiffs’ arguments at summary judgment were so vague and unclear as to be non-responsive to DMC’s summary judgment motion. Judge Cooper did not adopt this reasoning, holding that even an unopposed summary judgment motion must be evaluated to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. However, Judge Cooper still granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims, but for substantive reasons. To wit: Plaintiffs’ evidence was not direct evidence, much of it relied on inadmissible hearsay, and the claim that their working conditions were so intolerable as to force them to resign was undercut by the fact that they kept working there for 90 days after announcing their resignations. Therefore, Judge Cooper adopted the recommendations, with that one modification, and granted summary judgment on all claims.

The Court adopted the Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation, which is summarized below.

Plaintiff worked for the Governor’s Office of Student Achievement (“GOSA”). In early 2018, Plaintiff informed GOSA that she was pregnant, and after giving birth by cesarean section, she needed accommodation to work remotely due to complications from her surgery. Her doctor’s note did not provide a reason, and Dr. Good (Executive Director of GOSA) told her she needed to formally request an accommodation. Plaintiff was unable to get the paperwork from her doctor by the deadline (which Defendant had extended for her already once). Dr. Good terminated her.

Plaintiff brought three claims against GOSA. She argued that they discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and discriminated against her on the basis of her gender/pregnancy under Title VII. However, because the Court determined that she had caused the breakdown in the interactive process by not communicating a specific time when they could expect her paperwork, not bringing them the required paperwork, and GOSA had made an effort by extending the deadline they originally gave her, she was unable to show that GOSA’s termination of Plaintiff was pretextual.

The District Court adopted the findings and recommendations relating to Plaintiff’s Title VII and breach of contract claims. However, the Court declined to adopt the R&R findings related to the Plaintiff’s Georgia Whistleblower Act claim and the dependent attorney’s fees and punitive damages claims.

Plaintiff was hired by the City of Hampton, Georgia, to review, fix, and manage its finances. Plaintiff found some errors in the City’s finances. Specifically, he found questionable charges on credit cards and many budget amendments. When he brought it to the mayor, the mayor told him to adjust the budget so that the inconsistencies appeared to be fixed. Plaintiff refused. Eventually, Plaintiff’s mugshot was found, and the City Council became aware of Plaintiff’s criminal background (that he did not disclose during the application process). He was soon after that terminated for his false statements during his interview and on his application.

The District Court followed the recommendations of the magistrate judge and granted summary judgment in favor of the City on Plaintiff’s Title VII and breach of contract claims. Regarding the Title VII claim, Plaintiff could not find a valid comparator to show that he was treated less favorably. The magistrate judge could find no evidence showing racial discrimination led to his termination. As to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim regarding his alleged employment agreement, the City Charter stated all employees were at-will and subject to removal or suspension at any time. The District Court declined to follow the R&R and denied summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Georgia Whistleblower Act claim because Plaintiff was able to create questions of fact as to whether he engaged in protected activity, causation between his protected objection and his termination, and pretext.

The Court approved in part the Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation but ultimately denied the motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff claimed that Defendant retaliated and/or discriminated against her for taking medical leave by refusing to assign her to a teaching position after she returned and preventing her from obtaining partial unemployment benefits. Plaintiff objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that she did not carry her burden of showing pretext. Plaintiff argued that evidence such as the Leave Statements, standing alone, is sufficient to show pretext and when combined with other evidence, such as Plaintiff’s Supervisor’s (“Lewis”) allegedly inadequate job search, provides a “convincing mosaic” of pretext. The “Leave Statements” include the following comments that were made upon her return to work (Evans “should have thought about that before [she] went out on leave for that long.” Her supervisor “would decide where and when” Evans would return to work and that Evans “should be grateful that she was returning to work.” Her supervisor “reiterated that [Evans] should not have gone out on leave.”).

The Court found that there was significant disagreement as to the pretext and that a reasonable factfinder could find (1) that the Leave Statements (Lewis’ repeated statements that Evans should not have taken extended leave) did not simply represent Lewis’ explanation of the Absence Policy but rather reflected Lewis’ animus on account of Evans’ extended leave; (2) that the limited search for open positions as evidence that Lewis did not wish to place Evans in an open position for the remainder of the year as Evans’ punishment for taking extended leave; and (3) that Lewis found no suitable open positions in which to place Evans in light of Evans’ evidence that she was qualified for numerous positions open for the remainder of the 2017/2018 school year was false.

The Court approved and adopted the portion of the Report finding that (i) Evans has not provided direct evidence of discrimination; and (ii) Evans did not suffer an adverse employment action as a result of the Defendant decision not to seek partial unemployment benefits on her behalf. The Court declines to adopt the portion of the Report that finds Evans failed to carry her burden on the issue of pretext. Accordingly, the Court DENIED summary judgment on Evans’ FMLA claims. Additionally, because the Report’s recommendation of summary judgment on Evans’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims relies on the finding that Evans did not offer sufficient evidence of pretext, the Court similarly found that it was not appropriate to grant summary judgment on those claims. The Court found that there was still an open question as to whether Evans has established a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The Report assumed these questions, without deciding them, and proceeded directly to the issue of pretext.

The Court adopted the Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation, which is summarized below.

In June 2017, Defendant Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. (“Martin Marietta”) announced its intent to acquire another company. In order to avoid coming in conflict with antitrust laws, Martin Marietta proposed divestiture of its Forsyth Quarry, On February 12, 2018, Dobbs was informed that Martin Marietta would be divesting its quarry and that the employees would be changing employers. Dobbs was also told that if he tried to apply for employment at Martin Marietta, he would not be rehired. Dobbs testified that he believed that Martin Marietta was demoting him and terminating him based on his age by February 12, 2018, and he felt the same on April 10, 2018, when he was again notified that his employment with Martin Marietta was ending, and he would not be eligible for rehire. Dobbs filed an EEOC charge on October 22, 2018.

Martin Marietta argued that Dobbs failed to file an EEOC Charge within 180 days of when he knew or reasonably should have known that he was being discriminated against – February 12, 2018, or April 10, 2018, at the latest. 180 days from April 10, 2018, was October 8, 2018. Judge walker agreed, finding that that, based on Dobbs’ testimony, he had sufficient facts to support his contention that he was subjected to age discrimination as early as February 12, 2018, and no later than April 10, 2018. Accordingly, Judge Walker recommended that Martin Marietta’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.

Judge Walker also noted that Dobbs’ retaliation claim failed for another reason – it was temporally impossible. Dobbs alleged that the first time he engaged in protected activity was August 23, 2018. However, Dobbs was notified of the adverse actions on February 12, 2018, and April 10, 2018. Accordingly, it was not possible for the protected conduct to be causally connected to the protected activity because the retaliatory conduct must come after the protected activity.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant for 18 years. Between 2015 and 2018, Plaintiff worked with multiple P&G vendors, one of which was a company called Promoveo Health (“Promoveo”). Promoveo had and has a contract with P&G. Plaintiff filed suit for Title VII for sex discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff and Defendant both moved for summary judgment. The Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s motion.

The Court reviewed and adopted the Magistrate Judge’s analysis, as follows: With respect to Defendant’s motion, the court first stated that Plaintiff did not present any direct evidence of discrimination. The court found that Plaintiff did not present direct evidence of sex discrimination and her case rests solely on circumstantial evidence. The court then analyzed Plaintiff’s evidence of discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. The court found that Plaintiff presented aprima faciecase. While the court found that the Plaintiff did not point to any comparators that engaged in conduct that was remotely similar to her conduct, she was able to satisfy the fourth element of aprima faciecase because she could show a dispute as to material fact as to whether someone outside her protected class was her “replacement.”

The court went on to find that Defendant stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination, because P&G had lost trust and confidence in Plaintiff’s ability to perform her job based on her conduct. The court then concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant’s proffered reason for termination was pretextual because the undisputed evidence indicates that Defendant had a reasonable basis for concluding that she retaliated against Promoveo and that she conspired with the formerly terminated employee. Additionally, the court found that, while Plaintiff mentioned “convincing mosaic” in her brief, she did not cite to sufficient record evidence to rise to the level necessary for a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence of discrimination.

With respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the court found that, despite Plaintiff’s contention, she did not present direct evidence of discrimination because she cited to no record evidence that anyone at P&G ever said anything to her that would rise to the level of direct evidence of discrimination. The court then stated that she could not prove that she engaged in protected conduct based on a reasonable, good-faith belief that P&G had taken any action against her that could be viewed as discriminatory. The court stated that, even if Plaintiff could show she engaged in protected activity and while there was close temporal proximity between the termination and that activity, there were intervening factors, specifically Plaintiff’s conduct and P&G’s investigation into it, that had already begun and broke the causal link of temporal proximity alone. Additionally, even if Plaintiff had presented aprima faciecase of retaliation, as discussed above, P&G has presented significant evidence that it had a legitimate reason to terminate Plaintiff’s employment that was not related to her gender or any intent to retaliate against her, and Plaintiff has failed to present evidence establishing that P&G’s reasons were false or were not the true reasons for its decision.

The Court therefore adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED.

Plaintiff worked for a Harley-Davidson dealership as a sales associate. Plaintiff got a new supervisor, Jeff Lewis. Lewis made racist comments towards Plaintiff and about the predominantly African American customer base. Ultimately, Plaintiff was terminated because Defendant alleged that he had poor performance in 6 out of 14 categories in his evaluation and did not improve after discussions, as well as called in two hours after he was supposed to report to his shift. Plaintiff brought claims for a hostile work environment, racial discrimination, and retaliation. The Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to grant summary judgment for Defendant on the hostile work environment and retaliation claims. However, the Court overruled the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Defendant’s Motion be denied for Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim. The Court found that Plaintiff had not a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence. While the Court acknowledged that Lewis’s remarks showed clear racial animus, it found that Lewis was not involved in nor did he influence the decision to terminate Plaintiff.