Brooks v. Steadfast Services, Inc.; District Judge Amy Totenberg; Breach of Contract; Summary Judgment: Denied.
Crittendon et al v. International Follies, Inc. et al; District Judge Eleanor L. Ross; Minimum Wage Violation, Overtime, Wage Violation, Unlawful Taking of Tips/Kickbacks; Summary judgment: Granted in Part & Denied in Part.
Davis v. Dekalb County, Georgia; District Judge Leigh Martin May and Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand; Race Discrimination; Summary judgment: Granted.
Farrakhan v. Dal Global Services D/B/A Delta Global Services, Delta Airlines, and John Does 1–10; District Judge Michael L. Brown and Magistrate Judge Regina D. Cannon; race, national origin, and religious discrimination, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment; Summary Judgment: Granted.
Fulton v. Keith Lawson Company, Inc.; District Judge Eleanor L. Ross and Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard; Retaliation, Quid Pro Quo/Tangible Employment Action Sexual Harassment; Summary Judgment: Granted.
Nicole Owens v. State of Georgia, Governor’s Office of Student Achievement; District Judge Mark H. Cohen and Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker; Retaliation, Discrimination – gender/pregnancy; Summary Judgment: Granted.
Laura E. Alkins v. Butch Conway, in his official capacity; District Judge William M. Ray and Magistrate Judge Christopher C. Bly; Retaliation under the opposition clause of Title VII; Summary judgment: Granted.
Terry Riggins v. City of Atlanta and Michael Geisler; District Judge J.P. Boulee; Fraud, Georgia Whistleblower Act; Summary judgment: Granted.
Herman Quintana v. Smyrna Ready Mix Concrete LLC; District Judge Steve C. Jones and Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller; Race Discrimination, National Origin Discrimination, Retaliation, Hostile Work Environment; Summary judgment: Granted.
Guatemion (Juan) Mosley v. Preston Cycles West, LLC d/b/a Thunder Tower West Harley-Davidson; District Judge Steve C. Jones and Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand; Sexually hostile work environment, Racial Discrimination, Retaliation; Summary judgment: Granted in Part & Denied in Part.
Danny Lamonte v. City of Hampton, GA; District Judge Amy Totenberg and Magistrate Judge Catherine M. Salinas; Racial Discrimination, Violation of Georgia Whistleblower Act, Breach of Contract; Summary judgment: Granted.
Gladden v. The Proctor & Gamble Distributing, LLC; District Judge Charles A. Pannell and Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand; Sex Discrimination, Retaliation; Summary judgment: Granted.
Kelley v. Howden et al; District Judge William M. Ray, II and Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand; Race Discrimination, Retaliation; judgment Summary: Granted.
Lubin as trustee for the estate of Simpson v. Cox Communications, Inc.; District Judge Eleanor L. Ross and Magistrate Judge Russel G. Vineyard; Disability Discrimination, Retaliation; judgment Summary: Granted.
Olliff v. Emory University; District Judge Amy Totenberg and Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller; Failure to Make a Reasonable Accommodation, Retaliation; judgment Summary: Granted.
Schofield v. Ring Hospitality, LLC; District Judge Harold L. Murphy and Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson; Pregnancy Discrimination; judgment Summary: Denied.
Shelton v. Vertical Earth, Inc.; District Judge Steven D. Grimberg and Magistrate Judge John K. Larkins; FLSA Overtime, FMLA Interference and Retaliation; judgment Summary: Denied.
Amanda Duren v. International Follies, Inc., d/b/a Cheeta, and Jack Braglia; District Judge Eleanor L. Ross; Minimum Wage, Overtime Wage, Unlawful Taking of Tips (FLSA); Summary judgment: Granted in Part & Denied in Part.
Enrique Velez v. Oriental Weavers U.S.A., Inc.; District Judge Harold L. Murphy and Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson; Retaliation; judgment Summary: Denied.
CASE NAME: BROOKS V. STEADFAST SERVICES, INC.
Nature of Order: Summary Judgment Order
Magistrate Judge: N/A
District Judge: Amy Totenberg
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Breach of Contract
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff Kenneth Brooks alleged that Defendant Steadfast Services, Inc. (“Steadfast”) induced him to come to Florida to perform hurricane cleanup work by offering him a bonus. He filed suit alleging overtime violations under the FLSA and breach of contract with regard to the purported bonus. The FLSA claim was settled during the litigation.
Steadfast moved for summary judgment on the remaining breach of contract claim, basing its arguments exclusively on Georgia law. District Judge Amy Totenberg held that, under Georgia choice-of-law rules, contract claims are governed by the law of the state in which the contract was to be performed (in this case, Florida). However, Steadfast made no arguments based on Florida law. Since Steadfast had not cited to any controlling legal authority to show it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Judge Totenberg denied summary judgment. She also denied summary judgment because there was a slew of disputed material facts – including whether the bonus offer had been made in the first place.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: CRITTENDON ET AL V. INTERNATIONAL FOLLIES, INC. ET AL
Nature of the Order: Summary Judgment Order
Magistrate Judge: N/A
District Judge: Eleanor L. Ross
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Minimum Wage Violation (FLSA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted in Part & Denied in Part
- Claim: Overtime Wage Violation (FLSA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Unlawful Taking of Tips/Kickbacks (FLSA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiffs were adult entertainers/dancers for Defendants, an adult entertainment club, and its general manager. Plaintiffs alleged a variety of violations of their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. District Judge Eleanor L. Ross addressed each claim in turn.
Plaintiffs alleged Defendants unlawfully forced them to “pool” their tips with managers. For some alleged “managers”, Judge Ross found Plaintiffs were not “forced” to share their tips with them and did so voluntarily. However, for one “night manager”, Judge Ross found the tip-sharing was mandatory and there was a genuine dispute as to whether he was a manager. Thus, Judge Ross denied summary judgment as to the night manager and granted summary judgment as to the other managers.
Plaintiffs alleged Defendants failed to pay them overtime for pre-and post-shift activities like waiting for customers to leave. However, Judge Ross found these were non-compensable “preliminary and postliminary activities” and granted summary judgment as to the overtime claim.
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants illegally forced them to “kickback” part of their wages to various expenses that benefited the employer. However, Judge Ross found there was no evidence that the expenses were mandatory and required of Plaintiffs. Therefore, she granted summary judgment as to the “kickback” claim.
Finally, Judge Ross denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to whether any potential violation was “willful.” A “willfulness” finding extends the statute of limitations and, without such a finding, the Plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. However, since there had not yet been a jury finding that there was even a violation, Judge Ross found it was premature to decide whether any such violation was “willful.”
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: DAVIS V. DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA
Nature of the Order: Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: Justin S. Anand
District Judge: Leigh Martin May
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Title VII, race discrimination
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: 42 U.S.C. § 1981, race discrimination
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
For Race Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: African American
Summary:
Plaintiff, a Dekalb County Firefighter at the time of his employment with Dekalb County, filed suit against his former employer, alleging race discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1981. Defendant, after discovery closed, moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be granted.
Plaintiff was arrested for obstruction and disorderly conduct. Defendant launched an investigation and ultimately terminated Plaintiff because of his actions. The magistrate judge stated that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination, including the showing of a relevant comparator. Defendant argued that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination because Plaintiff’s conduct the night of his arrest warranted termination as opposed to the conduct of the comparator in this case, which Defendant contended did not warrant termination. The magistrate judge found that Defendant had satisfied its burden in showing that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination Plaintiff.
Next, Plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s reason for termination was pretextual because (1) there were inconsistencies in the reasons given by Defendant and (2) there were inconsistencies in the application of the employee policies. However, the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion because “[i]n the end, Plaintiff’s argument is nothing more than a dispute with the wisdom or fairness of the Defendant’s decision to terminate his employment when compared to Defendant’s decision to suspend Smalley [comparator] rather than terminate him.”
The magistrate judge also determined that Plaintiff did not cite to any evidence of a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would suggest that the decisionmaker harbored any discriminatory animus based on Plaintiff’s race. The magistrate judge agreed with Defendant that these statements were based on hearsay and not on Plaintiff’s personal knowledge.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: FARRAKHAN V. DAL GLOBAL SERVICES D/B/A DELTA GLOBAL SERVICES, DELTA AIRLINES, AND JOHN DOES 1–10
Nature of the Order: Magistrate Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: Regina D. Cannon
District Judge: Michael L. Brown
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Title VII, race, national origin, and religious discrimination
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: 42 U.S.C. § 1981, race/national origin discrimination
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: First Amendment
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Fourteenth Amendment
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: Japanese American
Religion of Plaintiff: Member of Nation of Islam
Summary:
Plaintiff, a Japanese American employee for Delta and a member of the Nation of Islam, filed suit on the above-mentioned clams. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. The magistrate judge found that Plaintiff has abandoned her constitutional claims and her discrimination claims based on her race or national origin and recommended granting summary judgment. Therefore, the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation only addressed the merits of the Title VII religious discrimination. The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim because Plaintiff was unable to show adverse employment action because she was temporarily suspended with pay with a six-day delay in receiving her paycheck. The magistrate judge also determined that, even if Plaintiff could satisfy the element of adverse employment action, she could not show that the employer’s reason for termination was pretext. The magistrate judge stated that her arguments rested only on her speculation that her employer’s investigation into her was because of her religion and was not enough to survive summary judgment.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: FULTON V. KEITH LAWSON COMPANY, INC.
Nature of the Order: Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: Russell G. Vineyard
District Judge: Eleanor L. Ross
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Retaliation (Title VII)
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Quid Pro Quo/Tangible Employment Action Sexual Harassment (Title VII)
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: Female
Summary:
Plaintiff Deanna Fulton alleged that she was hired as a Safety Coordinator by Defendant Keith Lawson Company, Inc. (“KLC”). However, she alleged, her foreman, Bernard Phelps, sexually harassed her and, when she rejected his advances, forced her to perform duties of the Helper position instead of Safety Coordinator duties. Finally, she alleged that, when she complained about Phelps’s harassment, she was officially demoted from Safety Coordinator to Helper. Fulton filed suit, alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII.
KLC moved for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard recommended granting summary judgment as to all claims. Essentially, Judge Vineyard concluded that the evidence showed KLC hired Fulton as a Helper and, thus, she had never been “demoted” from Safety Coordinator to Helper. All of KLC’s records identified Fulton as a “Helper” rather than a “Safety Coordinator.” Fulton’s evidence to contradict those records consisted entirely of inadmissible hearsay. And she admitted that her duties didn’t change, even after the alleged “demotion.” Thus, Judge Vineyard concluded that Fulton did not suffer from a materially adverse action, which is required for a retaliation claim. Similarly, Judge Vineyard concluded Fulton had not suffered a “tangible employment action”, which was a necessary element of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. Judge Vineyard, therefore, recommended granting summary judgment as to all of Fulton’s claims.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: NICOLE OWENS V. STATE OF GEORGIA, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
Nature of the Order: Magistrate Judge’s Final Report & Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: Linda T. Walker
District Judge: Mark H. Cohen
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: ADA – Retaliation
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: ADA – Discrimination
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Title VII Discrimination – gender/pregnancy
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff worked for the Governor’s Office of Student Achievement (“GOSA”). In early 2018, Plaintiff informed GOSA that she was pregnant, and after giving birth by cesarean section, she needed accommodation to work remotely due to complications from her surgery. Her doctor’s note did not provide a reason, and Dr. Good (Executive Director of GOSA) told her she needed to formally request an accommodation. Plaintiff was unable to get the paperwork from her doctor by the deadline (which Defendant had extended for her already once). Dr. Good terminated her.
Plaintiff brought three claims against GOSA. She argued that they discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and discriminated against her on the basis of her gender/pregnancy under Title VII. However, because the Court determined that she had caused the breakdown in the interactive process by not communicating a specific time when they could expect her paperwork, not bringing them the required paperwork, and GOSA had made an effort by extending the deadline they originally gave her, she was unable to show that GOSA’s termination of Plaintiff was pretextual.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: LAURA E. ALKINS V. BUTCH CONWAY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
Nature of the Order: Magistrate Judge’s Final Report & Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: Christopher C. Bly
District Judge: William M. Ray, II
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Retaliation under the opposition clause of Title VII
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff was employed by the Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Office from 1999 until her termination on February 23, 2018. On February 2, 2018, Plaintiff was called into Major Raymond Pelis’s office to discuss her upcoming routine transfer to the jail for work. Plaintiff told Major Pelis that she was kissed without her permission by Captain Jon Spear eight years prior. She was concerned she would have to work for Captain Spear if she was transferred. Three investigations later (two of which focused on statements Plaintiff made about the prior investigation), Plaintiff was terminated.
Plaintiff alleged that she was retaliated against in violation of Title VII when she was forced to take a polygraph, placed on leave, demoted, and terminated. The Court found, however, that she was unable to make a prima facie case of retaliation because it determined that a reasonable person would not find the circumstances surrounding the alleged sexual harassment to be so severe as to meet the standard. Specifically, the Court believed an open-mouth kiss was not overtly sexual and that it was not forced, despite acknowledging that Plaintiff froze, neither giving permission nor participating in the kiss.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: TERRY RIGGINS V. CITY OF ATLANTA AND MICHAEL GEISLER
Nature of the Order: Order
Magistrate Judge:
District Judge: J.P. Boulee
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Fraud
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Georgia Whistleblower Act
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff worked for Atlanta’s Department of Watershed Management. She went to an Atlanta City Council meeting to alert the Council of potential water contamination. Michael Geisler is the City’s former Chief Operating Officer. He met with the Council and told them that there would be no retaliation against employees who came to the meeting. The Council then summarized the concerns to Geisler. She was later terminated for making statements that were untrue.
Plaintiff brought one claim of fraud, which the Court dismissed because Plaintiff could not show actual malice on behalf of Geisler – the standard because Geisler had acted in his official capacity. Plaintiff also brought one claim under the Georgia Whistleblower Act. The Court determined the claim to be time-barred because Plaintiff had thought that her termination was retaliatory before she even received notice from Defendant.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: HERMAN QUINTANA V. SMYRNA READY MIX CONCRETE LLC
Nature of the Order: Final Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: J. Clay Fuller
District Judge: Steve C. Jones
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Race discrimination under § 1981
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: National origin discrimination under § 1981
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Retaliation under § 1981
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Race discrimination under Title VII
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: National origin discrimination under Title VII
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Retaliation under Title VII
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Hostile work environment under Title VII
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: Hispanic, Chilean
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff, a Hispanic man, worked as a truck driver. Upon being terminated for allegedly abandoning his job when he left early to go to the EEOC to file a charge of discrimination, Plaintiff filed claims for racial and national origin discrimination and a hostile work environment related to his supervisor’s racist comments (including the use of the n-word and references to Trump building a border to get remove “illegals”). Due to Plaintiff’s lack of complaints about the racist comments at the time and his failure to address Defendant’s good faith reliance on Plaintiff’s supervisor’s information in determining to terminate him for leaving “without permission,” the Court determined Plaintiff could not overcome Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: GUATEMION (JUAN) MOSLEY V. PRESTON CYCLES WEST, LLC D/B/A THUNDER TOWER WEST HARLEY-DAVIDSON
Nature of the Order: Final Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: Justin S. Anand
District Judge: Steve C. Jones
Claims & Outcomes:
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Racial discrimination in violation of Title VII
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Denied
- Claim: Retaliation in violation of Title VII
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Racial discrimination in violation of § 1981
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Denied
- Claim: Retaliation in violation of § 1981
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff worked for a Harley-Davidson dealership as a sales associate. Plaintiff got a new supervisor, Jeff Lewis. Lewis made racist comments towards Plaintiff and about the predominantly African American customer base. Ultimately, Plaintiff was terminated because Defendant alleged that he had poor performance in 6 out of 14 categories in his evaluation and didn’t improve after discussions, as well as called in two hours after he was supposed to report to his shift. Plaintiff brought claims for racial discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. The Court found against Plaintiff for the retaliation claim because Plaintiff was unable to provide comparators who were treated more favorably than him. The Court also found against him in the hostile work environment claim because he didn’t provide a reason that Defendant should be held liable for a co-worker’s sexual text messages, nor that Defendant could but failed to act sooner. But the Court did find that Plaintiff provided a strong enough convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence regarding his discrimination claims for them to survive summary judgment.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: DANNY LAMONTE V. CITY OF HAMPTON, GA
Nature of the Order: Final Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: Catherine M. Salinas
District Judge: Amy Totenberg
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Racial discrimination in violation of Title VII
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Violation of Georgia Whistleblower Act
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Breach of contract
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: Black
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff was hired by the City of Hampton, Georgia, to review, fix, and manage its finances. Plaintiff found some errors in the City’s finances. Specifically, he found questionable charges on the credit cards and many budget amendments. When he brought it to the mayor, the mayor told him to adjust the budget so that the inconsistencies appeared to be fixed. Plaintiff refused. Eventually, Plaintiff’s mugshot was found, and the City Council became aware of Plaintiff’s criminal background (that he did not disclose during the application process). He was soon thereafter terminated for his false statements during his interview and on his application.
The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for racial discrimination because Plaintiff could not find a valid comparator to show that he was treated less favorably, and the Court could find no evidence showing racial discrimination led to his termination. The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s claim under the Georgia Whistleblower Act because Plaintiff’s claim did not include that he articulated any particular law that had been broken to the mayor, and when the mayor told him how to handle the issue, he refused. The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim regarding his alleged employment agreement because the City Charter stated all employees were at-will, and subject to removal or suspension at any time.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: GLADDEN V. THE PROCTOR & GAMBLE DISTRIBUTING, LLC
Nature of the Order: Magistrate Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: Justin S. Anand
District Judge: Charles A. Pannell
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Title VII, sex discrimination
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
- Claim: Title VII, retaliation
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment be Granted
For Gender Discrimination Cases:
Gender of Plaintiff: Female
Summary:
Plaintiff worked for Defendant for 18 years. Between 2015 and 2018, Plaintiff worked with multiple P&G vendors, one of which was a company called Promoveo Health (“Promoveo”). Promoveo had and has a contract with P&G. Plaintiff filed suit for Title VII for sex discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff and Defendant both moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended that the Defendant’s motion be granted and Plaintiff’s motion be denied.
With respect to Defendant’s motion, the court first stated that Plaintiff did not present any direct evidence of discrimination. The court found that Plaintiff did not present direct evidence of sex discrimination and her case rests solely on circumstantial evidence. The court then analyzed Plaintiff’s evidence of discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. The court found that Plaintiff presented a prima facie case. While the court found that the Plaintiff did not point to any comparators that engaged in conduct that was remotely similar to her conduct, she was able to satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie case because she could show a dispute as to material fact as to whether someone outside her protected class was her “replacement.”
The court went on to find that Defendant stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination because P&G had lost trust and confidence in Plaintiff’s ability to perform her job based on her conduct. The court then concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant’s proffered reason for termination was pretextual because the undisputed evidence indicates that Defendant had a reasonable basis for concluding that she retaliated against Promoveo and that she conspired with the formerly terminated employee. Additionally, the court found that, while Plaintiff mentioned “convincing mosaic” in her brief, she did not cite to sufficient record evidence to rise to the level necessary for a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence of discrimination.
With respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the court found that, despite Plaintiff’s contention, she did not present direct evidence of discrimination because she cited to no record evidence that anyone at P&G ever said anything to her that would rise to the level of direct evidence of discrimination. The court then stated that she could not prove that she engaged in protected conduct based on a reasonable, good-faith belief that P&G had taken any action against her that could be viewed as discriminatory. The court stated that, even if Plaintiff could show she engaged in protected activity and while there was close temporal proximity between the termination and that activity, there were intervening factors, specifically Plaintiff’s conduct and P&G’s investigation into it, that had already begun and broke the causal link of temporal proximity alone. Additionally, even if Plaintiff had presented a prima facie case of retaliation, as discussed above, P&G has presented significant evidence that it had a legitimate reason to terminate Plaintiff’s employment that was not related to her gender or any intent to retaliate against her, and Plaintiff has failed to present evidence establishing that P&G’s reasons were false or were not the true reasons for its decision.
Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the court referenced much of its analysis on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and recommended it be denied.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: KELLEY V. HOWDEN ET AL
Nature of the Order: Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: Justin S. Anand
District Judge: William M. Ray, II
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Race Discrimination (Section 1981)
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Race Discrimination (Equal Protection Clause of 14th Amendment – Section 1983)
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Race Discrimination (Title VII)
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Retaliation (Section 1981)
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Retaliation (Title VII)
- Outcome: Recommend Summary Judgment Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: African-American
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff Christen Robinson Kelley, who is African-American, was hired as a Communications Specialist by Defendant Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency (“GEMA”). Her supervisor was Defendant Catherine Howden (“Howden”). Kelley’s non-African-American colleagues had a bigger starting salary and were promoted more quickly than Kelley. In November 2017, Howden told Kelley that her performance was not up to par, and Kelley complained to Howden that she was being treated differently than her peers. In January 2018, Kelley requested a promotion. Instead, the next month, Howden placed Kelley on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). After Kelley filed an EEOC charge and complained internally, she was transferred to a different supervisor and, months later, released from the PIP and given a promotion. Kelley ultimately filed suit, alleging race discrimination in pay and the initial failure to promote, and retaliation for being placed on the PIP shortly after what she argued was protected activity.
GEMA and Howden moved for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand recommended granting summary judgment as to all claims. For the discrimination claims, Judge Anand held Kelley did raise a prima facie case that she was treated worse than a similarly situated non-African-American colleague. However, Judge Anand found that Kelley could not prove Defendants’ justifications for this differential treatment (her colleague’s unique experience and Kelley’s own performance deficiencies) were pretext. Essentially, Kelley pointed to Defendants’ failure to follow their own internal protocols, but Judge Anand pointed out that this failure extended to her non-African-American colleagues, too. Kelley was not singled out because of her race, or at all. For the retaliation claim, Judge Anand found Kelley did not engage in protected activity because her general complaints about unfair treatment never alleged race discrimination or other unlawful discrimination. Judge Anand, therefore, recommended granting summary judgment as to all of Kelley’s claims.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: LUBIN AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE OF SIMPSON V. COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Report & Recommendation and Granting Summary Judgment
Magistrate Judge: Russel G. Vineyard
District Judge: Eleanor L. Ross
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Disability Discrimination (ADA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Retaliation (ADA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Retaliation (ADA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (GA State Law)
- Outcome: Claim Withdrawn by Plaintiff
Whether R&R Followed: Yes
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff Tiffany Simpson suffered from major depression and anxiety. Unfortunately, her job performance suffered as well. Still, she didn’t notify her employer, Defendant Cox Communications, Inc. of her disability until they told her that she was about to be placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) due to poor performance. Shortly thereafter, Simpson went out on FMLA leave to get mental health treatment. During her leave, her doctors provided several notes to Cox requesting time for her to get treatment. Also during her leave, she filed an EEOC charge alleging discrimination. Near the end of her leave, her doctors cleared her to return to work without restrictions. Upon her return to work, her PIP was re-implemented and, 30 days later, she was fired for poor performance. Also during these events, Simpson filed for bankruptcy but failed to disclose her claims against Cox to the bankruptcy court. After her termination, Simpson filed suit against Cox, alleging discriminatory discharge, retaliation, and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
At summary judgment, Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard denied Cox’s motion to dismiss the case based on judicial estoppel due to Cox’s failure to disclose her claims to the bankruptcy court. Instead, Judge Vineyard recommended substituting Jordan Lubin, the bankruptcy trustee, as the plaintiff to pursue the claims on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.
As to the substance of the ADA claims, Judge Vineyard skipped to the pretext analysis. He noted that the decision to place Simpson on a PIP preceded her disclosure of her disability, and so couldn’t have been caused by her disability. He also noted that Plaintiff failed to show that Cox’s justification for the PIP and termination (poor performance) was pretext. Similarly, Judge Vineyard rejected Plaintiff’s retaliation claim because the decision to place her on a PIP preceded her first protected activity and because Plaintiff had not shown that her poor performance was a pretext for retaliation. Finally, as to the failure to accommodate claim, Judge Vineyard found Simpson had never made a specific request for accommodation. Her doctors’ request for time to get treatment had already been granted in the form of FMLA leave. And, when she returned from leave, her doctor cleared her to work without restrictions. Thus, she did not request any accommodation. Judge Vineyard, therefore, recommended summary judgment be granted as to Plaintiff’s ADA claims. Because nobody objected to Judge Vineyard’s recommendation, District Judge Eleanor L. Ross adopted it as the opinion of the Court.
To read the full analysis, click here.
For a copy of the complete order, click here.
CASE NAME: OLLIFF V. EMORY UNIVERSITY
Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: J. Clay Fuller
District Judge: Amy Totenberg
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: ADA, Failure to Make a Reasonable Accommodation
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: ADA Retaliation
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
Whether R&R Followed: Yes.
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff Brian Olliff (“Olliff”) was employed by Defendant Emory University (“Emory”). He brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended (“ADA”). Plaintiff Brian Olliff brought claims against his former employer and Defendant Emory University. Olliff informed his then employer that he had anxiety, depression, and ADHD. After struggling to understand tasks assigned to him, instructions, and failing to meet expectations, his supervisor expressed her concerns. He then asked the employer for accommodations for his ADHD. Emory provided him with various accommodations, including a reduced workload (which they contend provided him with more time to handle his assigned workload), and the ability to close his door to cut down on distractions.
Olliff erred in not addressing many of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment arguments. Those claims, the Court decided, were to be considered abandoned. The court found the remaining claims to be equally uncompelling.
Emory argued it provided Olliff every reasonable accommodation he had requested. The Court agreed with Emory, stating that Emory had no obligation to change the essential functions of the job to accommodate Olliff, who continued to miss deadlines (causing more work and productivity issues for coworkers), failed to follow instructions, and continued to make mistakes, despite all the various forms of accommodation that had been provided to him. Thus, the Court recommended granting Emory’s motion for summary judgment.
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CASE NAME: SCHOFIELD V. RING HOSPITALITY, LLC
Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Report & Recommendation and Denying Summary Judgment
Magistrate Judge: Walter E. Johnson
District Judge: Harold L. Murphy
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Pregnancy Discrimination (Title VII/PDA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
Whether R&R Followed: Yes
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: Female
Summary:
Plaintiff Sabrina Schofield was an Assistant General Manager for Defendant Ring Hospitality, LLC, when she found out she was pregnant and told her supervisor. The next week, Schofield’s supervisor changed her schedule to unfavorable time slots and started ignoring her. 2 weeks after the pregnancy announcement, Defendant terminated Schofield. Defendant’s justification was poor work performance, meaning Schofield had difficulty meeting her 48-hour per week minimum work requirement and missed work. However, a non-pregnant coworker was not disciplined or terminated for the same problems – even when the coworker went so far as to miss a shift without warning (something Schofield never did). After her termination, Schofield filed suit against Defendant, alleging pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Defendant filed for summary judgment. However, Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson held that Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts and, therefore, admitted each of Plaintiff’s factual assertions. He further found that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination by showing how she was treated worse than a non-pregnant coworker who had committed the same misconduct. Judge Johnson also found that Plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of fact that Defendant’s justifications were pretext for discrimination. He noted that Schofield typically worked more than the 48-hour per week requirement, and that Defendant never told her that her performance was deficient. This evidence – combined with the short, 2-week gap between the announcement of Schofield’s pregnancy and her termination, the sudden adverse change in her work schedule, and the favorable treatment of a non-pregnant coworker – led Judge Johnson to conclude a jury could find pretext. Judge Johnson, therefore, recommended summary judgment be denied as to Plaintiff’s pregnancy discrimination claim. Defendant filed objections to this recommendation, but District Judge Harold L. Murphy summarily overruled the objections, adopted the recommendation as the opinion of the Court, and denied summary judgment.
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CASE NAME: SHELTON V. VERTICAL EARTH, INC.
Nature of the Order: Opinion and Order of District Judge Adopting Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge: John K. Larkins
District Judge: Steven D. Grimberg
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: FLSA Overtime
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
- Claim: FMLA Interference and Retaliation
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
Whether R&R Followed: Adopted.
Summary:
Plaintiff Elisabeth Shelton filed suit, alleging that Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay her overtime wages for times that she worked over forty hours and a violation of the FMLA by failing to notify her of her right to FMLA leave for her injury and for terminating her in retaliation for her injury-related absence. Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s FLSA claim failed as a matter of law because she was a bona fide exempt administrative employee and not entitled to overtime. Defendant also argued that the FMLA claims failed because Plaintiff did not request FMLA leave, and even if she did, Defendant decided to terminate her before she asked for leave. Magistrate Judge Larkins recommended that summary judgment be denied on all claims.
With respect to the FLSA claim analyzed the following tasks, as identified in Defendant’s brief: managing schedules, daily logs, involvement with work orders, pay applications, sorting mail and ordering office supplies, planning tasks for project managers, logging new construction jobs in foundations, and checking for underground utilities. Judge Larkins found that there were genuine issues of fact concerning Plaintiff’s job duties and that he could not conclude that the Defendant carried its burden in showing that Plaintiff was an exempt employee under the administrative exemption. The district court found that there was no clear error in the Magistrate’s conclusion and denied summary judgment.
With respect to the FMLA claims, Judge Larkins found that Plaintiff’s foot injury constituted a serious health condition because Defendant did not present evidence to the contrary and that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff provided sufficient notice that her absence from work was potentially FMLA-qualifying. Additionally, found that a reasonable jury could find, given the record, that Defendant had not taken sufficient steps to show that they had already decided to terminate Plaintiff at the time it learned of her FMLA-qualifying injury.
The district court reviewed the FMLA claims, because of Defendant’s objections, de novo and concluded the same as the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation. The Court denied summary judgment on all claims.
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CASE NAME: AMANDA DUREN V. INTERNATIONAL FOLLIES, INC., D/B/A CHEETA, AND JACK BRAGLIA
Nature of the Order: Order on Motion for Summary Judgment
Magistrate Judge: N/A
District Judge: Eleanor L. Ross
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Minimum Wage (FLSA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted in Part, Denied in Part
- Claim: Overtime Wage (FLSA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
- Claim: Unlawful Taking of Tips (FLSA)
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
Whether R&R Followed: N/A
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race of Plaintiff: N/A
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
The Defendants operate an adult entertainment club known as The Cheetah. The Plaintiff, Amanda Duren (“Duren”) worked at The Cheetah as an adult entertainer/dancer. Duren alleged that Defendants’ wage policies violated the FLSA for various reasons: (1) she was required to participate in an invalid tip pool; (2) she paid additional uncompensated fees which caused her wages to drop below minimum wage (e.g., paying for a mandatory work permit and parking fees); and (3) Defendants’ “waiting policy,” which required entertainers to engage in check-out procedures and remain on the job remain until all customers had departed, resulted in her working additional uncompensated time. Defendants’ Motion for Summary judgment asserted that (1) Duren’s minimum wage and overtime wage claims were not recoverable because she sought compensation for non-compensable postliminary activities; (2) The Cheetah’s tip policy was valid because no employers or managers participated in the tip pool, and (3) that none of Duren’s claims for other payment were recoverable under the FLSA because they were voluntarily made by Duren or she failed to articulate how the payments benefited the Cheetah.
First, the Court granted Defendants’ motion with regard to floormen, disc jockeys, and floor moms because floormen and disc jockeys were “regularly and customarily tipped” employees, and Duren failed to show that the house moms were included in the tip pool. The Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bob Johnson served as a manager/employer, and therefore denied Defendants’ motion on this point. The Court then turned to Duren’s overtime wage claims regarding her post-shift activities, finding that Duren is not entitled to receive compensation for her post-shift activities because they were not integral and indispensable to the principal activity she was employed to perform. Lastly, the Court rejected Duren’s claim for Defendants’ alleged unlawful taking of tips because she raised the majority of her allegations for the first time in her response to Defendants’ motion, and as to her remaining claim, she could not show that payments to house moms were mandatory or required by Defendants or for the employer’s benefit.
The Court, therefore, granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in all regards, except for Duren’s minimum wage claims that Bob Johnson was unlawfully part of the tip pool.
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CASE NAME: ENRIQUE VELEZ V. ORIENTAL WEAVERS U.S.A., INC.
Nature of the Order: Order on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Magistrate Judge: Walter E. Johnson
District Judge: Harold L. Murphy
Claims & Outcomes:
- Claim: Retaliation – Title VII
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
- Claim: Retaliation – Section 1981
- Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
Whether R&R Followed: Yes
For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:
Race/Ethnicity of Plaintiff: Hispanic
Gender of Plaintiff: N/A
Summary:
Plaintiff, Enrique Velez, was hired by Defendant, Oriental Weavers (“OW”) in March 2017. Mr. Velez’s immediate supervisor was Hany Arafat. Yassar Shaban was the Plant Manager and Kim Collette was the Human Resources Director. When Mr. Velez began working for OW, he observed and Hispanic employees complained to him that Mr. Arafat treated them worse than non-Hispanic employees in the way that he spoke to them and assigned them work. Hispanic employees also complained to Mr. Velez about discriminatory issues with their pay, which Mr. Velez observed first-hand.
Mr. Velez advised Mr. Arafat and Ms. Collette about the complaints of discrimination he was hearing and observing. Shortly thereafter, in October 2017, Mr. Velez was demoted. Mr. Velez was promoted back to his original position in April 2018. Shortly after being reinstated to this position, Mr. Velez again complained to Ms. Collette about discrimination issues. On June 6, 2018, Mr. Velez met with Mr. Shaban, Mr. Arafat, and Ms. Collette and repeated his complaints of discrimination. Following this conversation, Mr. Velez began to feel ill. He advised Ms. Collette that he would be taking the next two days off, and she replied that this was fine. When Mr. Velez returned to work, Ms. Collette advised him that he was being terminated for poor job performance. However, Mr. Arafat and Ms. Collette both testified that Mr. Velez was terminated for being out of work for two days.
The Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Final Report and Recommendation in full. The Magistrate Judge found that Mr. Velez could establish a prima facie case of retaliation and that OW’s reasons for termination were pretextual. Mr. Velez complained multiple times about discrimination against Hispanic employees, and he was fired at most five days after his last complaint. Mr. Velez showed that he asked for and received permission from Ms. Collette to take time off and that he was not the only employee who struggled to meet the performance quota instated by OW. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge noted that OW’s two reasons for termination are fundamentally inconsistent, establishing that the reasons were pretextual.
The Court, therefore, Adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Final Report and Recommendation and Denied Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
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