Summary Judgment Orders From August

DeLoach v. CSX Transportation, Inc.; District Judge Mark H. Cohen and Magistrate Judge Alan J. Baverman; ADA – Reasonable Accommodation; Summary Judgment: Granted.

Hendricks v. Henry County, Georgia; District Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. and Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard; Discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, Failure to Make a Reasonable Accommodation; Summary Judgment: Granted.

Moore v. Cobb County School District; District Judge Michael L. Brown and Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson; FMLA Interference/Retaliation, Disability Discrimination, Retaliation; Summary Judgment: Granted in Part & Denied in Part.

Ronald Kinslow and Lucas Hill v. 5 Star Field Services Group, LLC, Title One Management, LLC, and Robert Gilstrap; District Judge Michael L. Brown; Failure to Pay Overtime Wages, Breach of Contract; Summary Judgment: Denied.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Georgia, Inc.; District Judge Amy Totenberg and Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson; ADA – Reasonable Accommodation; Summary Judgment: Granted in Part & Denied in Part.

Virginia Marie Nye v. Alloy Wheel Repair Specialists, LLC; District Judge J. P. Boulee and Magistrate Judge John K. Larkins III; Hostile Work Environment, Retaliation, Summary Judgment: Granted.

Vincent Denson v. DeKalb County School District; District Judge Clarence Cooper and Magistrate Judge Alan J. Baverman; Discrimination, Retaliation; Summary Judgment: Granted.

CASE NAME: DELOACH V. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation, Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Magistrate Judge: Alan J. Baverman

District Judge: Mark H. Cohen

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: ADA – Reasonable Accommodation
   • Outcome: Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to liability is Granted; Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary:

DeLoach worked as a locomotive engineer for CSX Transportation, Inc. In this role, he was responsible for ensuring the safe operation of a train by controlling the speed, direction, breaking, and secondary systems. DeLoach suffered sudden onset cardiac arrest on June 6, 2015, and was diagnosed with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, which is not curable and comes with a high risk for a subsequent cardiac arrest. To treat this condition, DeLoach had an implantable cardiac defibrillator (“ICD”) placed in his chest, which delivers an electric shock to the heart if an arrhythmia is detected. DeLoach’s doctor informed him that any discharge of the ICD could cause DeLoach to faint or lose consciousness. There is an increased risk of accidental discharge in the first year after the ICD is implanted. CSX informed DeLoach that he was not medically qualified to return to work until he had his ICD for one year without any discharges. DeLoach remained out of work for one year, and he returned fully to work upon the expiration of that year. DeLoach claims that CSX violated the ADA by arbitrarily removing him from his position for one year.

The Magistrate Judge found, and the Court agreed, that DeLoach could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because De Loach posed a “direct threat” and was not otherwise qualified for the locomotive engineer position based upon the severity and nature of the potential harm that could occur if he was unable to operate the train. Further, CSX proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions: legitimate safety concerns about the accidental discharge of the ICD. DeLoach failed to prove that this reason was false and based instead on his disability.

Therefore, the Court GRANTED Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: HENDRICKS V. HENRY COUNTY, GEORGIA

Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge: Russell G. Vineyard

District Judge: Timothy C. Batten, Sr.

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claims: Discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, Failure to Make a Reasonable Accommodation
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted

Whether R&R Followed: Yes.

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary:

Plaintiff Herbert Hendricks (“Hendricks”) was hired as an Equipment Operator II for Henry County’s Department of Transportation on August 27, 2018. The job description to which he had responded listed various types of equipment that the applicant would be required to know how to operate. Hendricks informed the interviewer that he had limited experience with equipment but was hired anyway. Two weeks later, upon informing his employer of his vision problems, including glaucoma, Henry County terminated his employment. Hendricks filed a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The Court found that Hendricks failed to establish a prima facie case because he could not show he was a qualified individual. His argument had been that he was qualified because Henry County hired him knowing he didn’t meet the requirements included in the job description and he had not been asked to use other equipment. The Court decided that was mere speculation and speculation is not enough to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Because Hendricks failed to identify an accommodation that would enable him to perform the essential functions of the job, including operating equipment with which he was unfamiliar, Hendricks failed to meet his burden of establishing a reasonable accommodation, and the recommendation was that the motion for summary judgment be granted.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: MOORE V. COBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge: Walter E. Johnson

District Judge: Michael L. Brown

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: FMLA Interference
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
2. Claim: FMLA Retaliation
   • Outcomes: Summary Judgment Denied
3. Claim: Disability Discrimination under ADA and Rehabilitation Act
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
4. Claim: Disability Retaliation under ADA and Rehabilitation Act
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
5. Claim: Retaliation under Title VII
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
6. Claim: Retaliation under Title VI
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted

Whether R&R Followed: Yes, as to recommendations; the Court overrules the Magistrate’s R&R on two facts and one legal element that do not ultimately impact the recommendations.

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: African American

Gender of Plaintiff: Female

Summary:

The Court adopted the Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation, which is summarized in the full analysis, linked below. The Court stated, “The Court’s decision to reject the Magistrate Judge’s finding as to two of the facts and the second element of McDonnell Douglas for the retaliation claims does not impact the Court’s decision otherwise to adopt the recommendation that it grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s motion.” There were two facts that the Court interpreted differently than the Magistrate Judge. This summary does not discuss these factual differences as it did not require a different conclusion that the one the Magistrate Judge reached. With respect to the second element of McDonnell Douglas for the retaliation claims, the Court could not determine whether there was legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for termination because the Court found that there was a genuine dispute as to material fact as to who decided to not renew Plaintiff’s contract. However, this did not change the ultimate recommendation reached by the Magistrate Judge as he recommended denying summary judgment on the retaliation claims.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: RONALD KINSLOW AND LUCAS HILL V. 5 STAR FIELD SERVICES GROUP, LLC, TITLE ONE MANAGEMENT, LLC, AND ROBERT GILSTRAP

Nature of the Order: Opinion and Order on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Magistrate Judge: N/A

District Judge: Michael L. Brown

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Failure to Pay Overtime Wages (FLSA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
2. Claim: Breach of Contract
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
3. Claim: Intentional Breach of Contract
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied

Whether R&R Followed: N/A

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary

Title One is a residential property management company and Five Star does maintenance and rehab of residential rental properties for Title One. Defendant Robert Gilstrap is the sole owner of both companies. Plaintiffs performed maintenance work for Defendants.

The Court first addressed Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims, beginning with whether Gilstrap was an “employer” under the FLSA. The Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gilstrap was an employer based on Plaintiffs’ allegations that he was involved in day-to-day operations and had some direct responsibility for Plaintiffs’ supervision. Turning to Title One and Five Star, the Court initially noted, particularly with regard to whether Defendants had two or more employees, that Defendants’ arguments mainly consisted of the fact that Plaintiffs did not prove that Defendants were subject to liability. Defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. The Court then focused on Plaintiffs’ burden to prove the number of hours they worked for which they were improperly compensated. When an employer fails to keep adequate records, the employee can simply show an estimate of hours. Plaintiffs met this burden, and Defendants were unable to rebut with specific evidence to the contrary. Finishing the analysis, the Court found that Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants, rather than independent contractors, based upon the six factors of the economic realities test. The Court also rejected Defendants’ argument that Five Star and Title One are not joint employers.

With regard to the breach of contract claims, the Court held that Plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiffs were paid incorrectly, and sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to estimate damages. Lastly, the Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants breached the contract with knowledge and for the purposes of depriving plaintiff of benefits.

The Court, therefore, Denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION V. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF GEORGIA, INC.

Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation, Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Magistrate Judge: Walter E. Johnson

District Judge: Amy Totenberg

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: ADA – Reasonable Accommodation
   • Outcome: Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to liability is Granted; Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary:

Sharion Murphy, represented by the EEOC, suffers from claustrophobia and post-traumatic stress disorder. Accordingly, she avoided entering Defendant Kaiser’s facility through the revolving doors. When Kaiser informed Ms. Murphy that she was required to use the revolving doors for security reasons, she provided a doctor’s note indicating her disability and need to use a non-revolving door. Kaiser did not approve Ms. Murphy’s request for accommodations until nearly four months after she initially sent in the doctor’s note.  The Court found that Kaiser failed to provide a reasonable accommodation to Ms. Murphy because it was required to make its facility accessible to individuals with disabilities, and this obligation could easily have been met by allowing Ms. Murphy to use a non-revolving door within a reasonable time after she made her initial request. Additionally, the Court noted that Kaiser was obliged under the ADA and EEOC regulations to accommodate Ms. Murphy without first determining whether her disability impacted her ability to perform the essential functions of her job.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: VIRGINIA MARIE NYE V. ALLOY WHEEL REPAIR SPECIALISTS, LLC

Nature of the Order: Order Approving and Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Final Report and Recommendation, Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.

Magistrate Judge: John K. Larkins III

District Judge: J. P. Boulee

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Title VII – Hostile Work Environment (Gender)
   • Outcome: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Granted
2. Claim: Title VII – Retaliation
   • Outcome: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Granted

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: Female

Summary

Plaintiff Virginia Marie Nye was hired by Defendant Allow Wheel Repair Specialists, LLC (“AWRS”) in November 2010 and Rob Wheeley was installed as CEO. In the summer of 2016, Dawn Clark, the national sales account manager, informed Nye that she was having an affair with Wheeley. In April 2017, responsibility for national accounts sales was taken from Plaintiff and given to Duane Code, apparently at Wheeley’s insistence. Nye alleged that she had problems with her male colleagues and management, albeit not of a sexual nature. Additionally, she raised issues with what she described as the “boys club mentality” at AWRS under Wheeley, and that she felt left out of the “inner circle.” Nye also asserted that she suffered retaliation because she reported that Wheeley and Clark had been having an affair, including receiving a write up from Wheeley and that Wheeley ignored her and stayed away from her as much as he possibly could.

Beginning with the retaliation claim, AWRS argued that the claim was untimely because the relevant allegations came more than 180 days before plaintiff filed her EEOC charge. According to the Court, Nye’s response to AWRS’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim was entirely unresponsive to AWRS’s argument. The Court found that Summary Judgment was proper on this basis alone, but even if Nye had not abandoned her retaliation claim, the claim would still fail because Nye put forth no evidence that the decision maker had knowledge of her protected conduct. Moving on to the hostile work environment claim, AWRS also claimed that Nye’s hostile claims were untimely. Nye claimed that if any act contributing to her claim occurred within 180 days before she filed her EEOC charge, then every act included in the claim was saved. The Court explained the discrete act must be sufficiently related to the hostile work environment claim to be considered part of the same claim, and that was not the case here. The key was that discrete acts alone cannot form the basis of a hostile work environment claim.

Therefore, the Court GRANTED Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: VINCENT DENSON V. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation, Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Magistrate Judge: Alan J. Baverman

District Judge: Clarence Cooper

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Title VII – Discrimination (Race)
   • Outcome: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted
2. Claim: Title VII – Discrimination (Sex)
   • Outcome: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted
3. Claim: Title VII – Retaliation
   • Outcome: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: African American

Gender of Plaintiff: Male

Summary:

Plaintiff Vincent Denson worked as a principal in Defendant DeKalb County School District (“DCSD”). In March or April 2018, the DCSD Superintendent decided that Denson should not be renewed as principal and would be reassigned and given a teacher’s contract for the following year. A month after Denson’s contract was signed, in June 2018, the Regional Superintendent, Dr. Bernetta Jones, made inappropriate comments at a principal’s transition meeting that Denson attended. Dr. Jones used the term “white girl” and chastised Black male employees to not let white female employees outperform them. Denson complained about this incident to DCSD’s then-general counsel. Denson then filed his first EEOC Charge alleging race and sex discrimination over being removed as principal. Denson applied for several administrative positions with DCSD in the second half of the summer of 2018. He claims that he was the most qualified candidate, but was not selected for any of these positions. He then filed a second EEOC Charge alleging relation in November 2018.

Denson abandoned all his claims except for his sex discrimination claim for one unsuccessful application to an administrative position – the Assistant Principal position at Miller Grove Middle School. Defendant argued that Denson’s remaining claim was not included in his Second EEOC Charge and should therefore be dismissed. The Court agreed. Denson’s second EEOC Charge was based on retaliation under Title VII. In this charge, he asserted that he had not been hired for two positions, including the Assistant Principal position at Miller Grove, because of retaliation. Additionally, Denson’s second EEOC Charge appeared to involve different people and events than the claims he asserted in his Complaint. The Court found that the claims asserted in Denson’s case could not be reasonably expected to grow out of his second Charge.

Therefore, the Court GRANTED Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: BILL PASLEY AND MYRA GREEN V. RELOGIO, LLC ET. AL.

Nature of the Order: FinalReport and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge: Walter E. Johnson

District Judge: Harold L. Murphy

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment – Title VII (Pasley)
   • Outcome: Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to liability Granted; Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Denied
2. Claim: Retaliation – Title VII (Pasley)
   • Outcome: Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to liability is Granted; Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Denied
3. Claim: Retaliation – Title VII (Green)
   • Outcome: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Denied
4. Claim: Assault (Pasley)
   • Outcome: Supplemental Jurisdiction Declined
5. Claim: Battery (Pasley)
   • Outcome: Supplemental Jurisdiction Declined
6. Claim: Ratification (Pasley)
   • Outcome: Supplemental Jurisdiction Declined
7. Claim: Battery (Pasley)
   • Outcome: Supplemental Jurisdiction Declined

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary:

Plaintiff Billy Pasley alleges that his supervisor, Defendant Traci Zirkelbach, made inappropriate comments to him and touched him in any inappropriate manner. Mr. Pasley was terminated after complaining about these incidents. Mr. Pasley then contacted a co-worker, Myra Green, about his right to file a charge with the EEOC. Ms. Green confirmed that he could file a charge, and he did so. Mr. Pasley and Ms. Green allege that the operator of one of the defendants, Kent Popham, accused Ms. Green of assisting Mr. Pasley with filing the charge and terminated her employment for that reason.

The Court found that Ms. Zirkelbach, as Mr. Pasley’s supervisor, did not cause him any tangible job detriment because he rejected her sexual advances. Rather, Mr. Popham directed Ms. Zirkelbach to fire Mr. Pasley for reasons of his own and threatened to fire Ms. Zirkelbach if she did not comply with his demands. In other words, Ms. Zirkelbach did not make the decision to terminated Mr. Pasley’s employment. Further, the Defendants were able to establish the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. It was undisputed that the Defendants maintained a policy prohibiting sexual harassment, and Mr. Pasley did not report sexual harassment per the policy.

Regarding the retaliation claims, The Court found that Mr. Pasley’s claim failed because could not establish a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination. Mr. Popham, the decision maker was unaware of Mr. Pasley’s comments to Ms. Zirkelbach.

As for Ms. Green, the Court found that she could maintain a claim for retaliation. The key fact here was that Mr. Popham believed that Ms. Green assisted Mr. Pasley in filing his EEOC charge, regardless of whether she actually did so. Mr. Popham’s belief and Ms. Green’s subsequent termination were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The Court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Popham’s real motivation was to punish Ms. Green for allegedly assisting Mr. Pasley with his charge and that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ms. Green lied to Mr. Popham about her contacts with Mr. Pasley. The Court, therefore, denied Defendant’s Motion on Ms. Green’s retaliation claim.

The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims because it recommended dismissing Mr. Pasley’s claims under Title VII.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: PATEL V. WELLSTAR ATLANTA MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Report & Recommendation and Granting Summary Judgment

Magistrate Judge: Linda T. Walker

District Judge: Eleanor L. Ross

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Age Discrimination (ADEA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
2. Claim: Retaliation (ADEA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary:

Plaintiff Paresha Patel was a Nuclear Medicine Technologist for Defendant WellStar Atlanta Medical Center, Inc.  Patel complained to management that she was unfairly being assigned fewer hours than two colleagues.  The colleagues were 11-13 years younger than her, but she never referenced her age as the reason for the different treatment.  WellStar dismissed her complaint.  Later, WellStar determined that Patel, in violation of company policy, accessed individual patient medical records in an attempt to substantiate her claims of unfair assignment of hours by showing that colleagues worked more hours on the patients in question.  WellStar terminated Patel.  After her termination, Patel filed suit against Defendant, alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

Defendant filed for summary judgment on both claims and Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker recommended granting Defendant’s motion.  Plaintiff objected to the recommendation with respect to the retaliation claim only, arguing that Judge Walker failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (Plaintiff), as required at summary judgment.  District Judge Eleanor L. Ross overruled Plaintiff’s objection, noting that – even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff – Patel had not engaged in protected activity because her complaints never referenced age discrimination.  Because Patel had not engaged in protected activity, her retaliation claim failed as a matter of law.  Judge Ross, therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: PRUITT V. CITY OF ATLANTA, SGT. JOHN T. ELLIS, AND LT. MICHAEL S. KREHER, IN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Nature of the Order: Renewed Motion as to Qualified Immunity for Summary Judgment Denied

Magistrate Judge: Linda T. Walker

District Judge: Amy Totenberg

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claims (at issue in this order): Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection via Section 1983
   • Outcome: RenewedMotion as to Qualified Immunity for Summary Judgment Denied

Whether R&R Followed: Yes.

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

Gender of Plaintiff: Female

Summary:

Plaintiff was a police officer with APD’s Vice Unit and worked a large sting operation that was ultimately videotaped. At the time of the sting operation that was being videotaped, Plaintiff removed her clothes to secure an arrest based on assurances from her supervisor that any nude footage of her would be deleted. Instead, the footage was saved and viewed by numerous male police officers. Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave when certain city administrators viewed her as too emotionally distraught to continue in her job. Once Plaintiff returned nine months later, she was reassigned to fleet vehicle management and open records units, despite her reputation as one of the best undercover vice cops in the department.

Defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim brought via Section 1983 against Defendants in their individual capacities. There has been a previous denial of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII sexual discrimination/harassment claim, which countered Magistrate Judge Walker’s recommendation of granting the motion. That R&R by Judge Walker did not sufficiently address Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. As such, the previous order by the district court was the first time that the Defendants’ qualified immunity defense was assessed. In that previous order, the Court noted that Defendants failed to show why each individual Defendant was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, which is an individual defense and not a collective one. The Court denied that motion for summary judgment without prejudice and granted the Defendants leave to refile their motion on that limited issue. The renewed motion followed. The Court, as needed in addressing qualified immunity, detailed its previous findings that led to the denial of the motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work enviroment/sex discrimination claim. In this order, the Court denied the renewed motion here because it found that there were genuine disputes as to material fact that would permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of Plaintiff under clearly established law in this Circuit. The Court found that neither Defendant Ellis nor Defendant Kreher were availing given its conclusions on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim previously. The Court then analyzed whether the Defendants were on notice of clearly established law via a two-part test: (1) whether the facts, in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, show that the Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) if so, whether that right was clearly established. The Court concluded, based on several cases in this Circuit, that Defendant Ellis (who disseminated the video of Plaintiff) and Defendant Kreher’s (who refused to consider Plaintiff’s grievance over the incidents) conduct would have been obviously unlawful to any reasonable supervisor in their position (see the linked order for greater factual detail). Accordingly, the Court denied the renewed motion for qualified immunity.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: SCHULMAN V. SAPP

Nature of the Order: Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

District Judge: Timothy C. Batten, Jr.

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Section 1981
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
2. Claim: Section 1985(3)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
3. Claim: Tortious Interference with Contract
   • Outcome: Dismissed without prejudice

Whether R&R Followed: N/A

For Race Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: Caucasian

Short Summary:

Traffic Troopers, owned by Sapp, is a flagging and traffic directing company that hires Fulton County deputy sheriffs. On September 7, 2016, the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office’s Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) received an anonymous complaint about a deputy poorly directing traffic. After receiving the complaint, Brown, a captain, directed Sergeant Sarah Gregory to open an investigation. Subsequently, Brown discovered that Schulman worked for Traffic Troopers and questioned Schulman about his duties there. Schulman responded that he was performing security and flagger work for Traffic Troopers. He also denied representing the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office by wearing its uniform during his flagging work. Sapp (“commander on duty”) e-mailed Brown because she had believed (because he provided his POST certification and a copy of his FCSO identification) that Schulman was a non-reserve Fulton County sheriff’s deputy. After receiving Sapp’s e-mail, Brown instructed Sergeant Gregory to re-open the prior investigation. Schulman repeated that he was hired for traffic control. OPS subsequently concluded that Schulman violated the OPS Procedures because he held himself out to be a law enforcement officer by providing his POST certification and FCSO identification to Sapp. OPS terminated Schulman’s reserve deputy status. This termination led to Schulman filing this lawsuit. After filing suit, many FCSO officers told Schulman that they could not work for Schulman’s company, Georgia Security Management. The sheriff’s office has a policy that forbids any officer from working for a company that is owned or managed by persons involved in a pending lawsuit with the county.

Plaintiff brought a Section 1981 claim but failed to bring the claim appropriately via Section 1983. Because Defendant’s preemptively argued that the Court should reject the claim if it were to view it as properly brought via Section 1983, the Court “narrowly” held that “if a defendant responds to an unpled but possible § 1983 claim, the Court can consider the claim.” The Court went on to grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sua sponte Section 1983/Section 1981 claim because the Plaintiff could not show pretext. The Court stated that Plaintiff could not “point to any specified instances of racial discrimination outside of his general allegations and does not dispute that his personnel file does not contain complaints by him alleging racial discrimination.”

The Court further concluded that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim failed because Plaintiff cannot show that at least one of Fulton County Defendants conspired with Sapp as the only record evidence was one email from Sapp. The Court also stated that Plaintiff did not introduce any disputed material facts to show that he was harmed by Defendants.

With respect to Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, the Court dismissed these without prejudice because it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: WOODS V. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

Nature of the Order: Final Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge: Christopher C. Bly

District Judge: Steven D. Grimberg

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Sex Discrimination (Title VII)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
2. Claim: Race Discrimination (1981)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: African American

Gender of Plaintiff: Female

Summary

Plaintiff is an African American female. In 2015, as a result of a reorganization plan and workforce reduction policy (and down-leveling of some employees), Plaintiff and three male senior managers were grouped together, as they had similar skills and held similar positions. The workforce reduction committee reviewed the four senior managers’ factor scores and past performance ratings, pursuant to the reduction in force policy. Bryant McKee, and African American male, had the highest score and was transferred to a different role in a different program. John Strickland, a Caucasian male, received the next best score and took over the new consolidated senior manager position. Bryan Batt, a Caucasian male, received the third best score, and was reclassified into a different position. Plaintiff received the lowest score and was identified for layoff. Ultimately, however, she was given the option to select a down-leveled position. Plaintiff chose the down-leveled, lower-level manager position.

The Court decided to recommend that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted because, while Plaintiff easily established a prima facie case of discrimination, she was unable to show that Defendant’s legitimate reason for down-leveling her was pretext for discrimination. In fact, she failed to provide evidence showing Defendant’s decision to down-level her was the result of discriminatory animus, and instead focused on arguing that she was more qualified than the person ultimately chosen to take her old position. Additionally, she failed to respond to Defendant’s statement of material facts and consequently, Defendant’s facts were admitted.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: ANDERSON V. EMORY HEALTHCARE, INC.

Nature of the Order: Order

Magistrate Judge: Alan J. Baverman

District Judge: Clarence Cooper

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Retaliation under participation clause (Title VII)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary

Judge Baverman conducted a de novo review of the issues to which Nazarie Romain Anderson (“Plaintiff”) objected after Judge Cooper recommended that Emory Healthcare, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment be granted. The Court determined that Plaintiff’s objections were without merit for the persuasive reasons that Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Objections articulated.

Specifically, the Court determined that Defendant’s good-faith basis for terminating Plaintiff was not one that had to be made by a jury. Defendant’s Response addressed Plaintiff’s failure to reference or cite to any legal authority to support her contention that a jury had to determine whether the decisionmaker had an honest, good faith belief that Plaintiff engaged in misconduct. Rather, she based her objection to the R&R on her unsupported belief that a jury must always make that determination. Moreover, Defendant pointed out that Plaintiff attempted to rely on speculation and multiple inferences to satisfy her burden of showing that Defendant intentionally retaliated against her, which the Court had stated was insufficient.

Judge Baverman overruled Plaintiff’s Objections and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: COLLEY V. GEORGIA-PACIFIC, LLC

Nature of the Order: Order adopting Judge Walker’s R&R

District Judge: Steven D. Grimberg

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Disability Discrimination (ADA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
2. Claim: Disability Retaliation (ADA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
3. Claim: Retaliation (FMLA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary:

Colly (“Plaintiff”) was terminated in August 2018 from her employment with Georgia-Pacific (“Defendant”). Prior to her termination, Plaintiff took FMLA leave from March 2018 to June 2018, and remained on leave once her FMLA leave was exhausted by using Defendant’s non-FMLA extended leave policy. That policy grants eligible employees additional leave, but the extended leave may be terminated if the employee’s position is filled. Once Plaintiff was on the extended leave, Defendant notified her in June 2018 that it was posting her position for hiring; the position was ultimately filled in August 2018. Additionally, soon after starting her FMLA leave, Plaintiff submitted a complaint, through a 1-800 number used by employees to report concerns, that a former supervisor was “loud, condescending, rude, and . . . bullying,” creating a hostile work environment. Plaintiff also contends that, while she was on leave, Defendant terminated her access to the workplace, as well as her work-related accounts and communications.

Judge Grimberg addressed five different objections made by Plaintiff in response to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the Court grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. First, he stated that Plaintiff failed to show how her internal complaint rose to the level of protected activity, and how the five-month period between the complaint and Plaintiff’s termination are causally created. Second, he stated that Judge Walker correctly decided that a discontinuation of Plaintiff’s access while she was on leave did not constitute an adverse action, regardless of whether it was done previously or not – meaning Plaintiff cannot show she was retaliated against as a matter of law.

Third, again, he stated that Judge Walker correctly decided that Defendant made a sufficient showing of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for removing Plaintiff’s access that might motive a reasonable employer. Moreover, Judge Walker properly decided that the undisputed evidence shows there was no policy regarding the removal of access. Plaintiff cannot show deviation from a non-existent policy and she has not made a showing of pretext. In her fourth and fifth objections, Plaintiff argued Judge Walker assumed facts not in evidence, however Judge Grimberg stated that Judge Walker properly determined that Plaintiff was required to show that she could perform the essential functions of her employment position to be a qualified individual under the ADA.

Therefore, the Court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: BARNES V. EMORY HEALTHCARE SERVICES MANAGEMENT, LLC (EMORY HEALTHCARE, INC.)

Nature of the Order: Order

Magistrate Judge:

District Judge: J.P. Boulee

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Interference (FMLA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
2. Claim: Retaliation (FMLA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary:

Prior to Lasonya Barnes’ (“Plaintiff”) resignation from Emory Healthcare Services Management, LLC (“Defendant”) in September 2016, she worked as an Electrocardiogram Technician (EKG Technician) at Emory’s hospital in Decatur. She resigned after making unsuccessful attempts to find a new position within Emory after a medical issue prevented her from continuing to work in as an EKG Technician. Plaintiff brought interference and retaliation claims under the FMLA.

The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for the Defendant because Plaintiff did not cite to record evidence in support of her claim that she was able to perform all of the essential functions of her job at the end of her FMLA leave. Because she did not object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the Court reviewed for clear error and, finding none, adopted the Report. The Court also granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim based on the fact that the record showed that the decision maker was unaware of Plaintiff’s protected conduct at the time of the adverse employment action.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: BUTLER V. THE COCA-COLA COMPANY AND YU SHI

Nature of the Order: Order

Magistrate Judge:

District Judge: Amy Totenberg

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Section 1981
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
2. Claim: ADA
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
3. Claim: Title VII Disparate Treatment (bereavement leave, denial of volunteer activities, denial of work from home, denial of lateral transfer, assignment of exit checklist duties)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
4. Claim: Title VII Retaliation
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
5. Claim: Title VII Hostile Work Environment
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
6. Claim: Title VII Constructive Discharge
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
7. Claim: Title VII (against Yu Shi individually)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
8. Claim: IIED under state law
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
9. Claim: Title VII Disparate Treatment (denial of overtime pay)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Not Recommended
10. Claim: Title VII Punitive Damages (denial of overtime pay)
    • Outcome: Summary Judgment Not Recommended
11. Claim: FLSA
    • Outcome: Summary Judgment Not Recommended

Whether R&R Followed: Granted in part, denied in part

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: African American

Gender of Plaintiff: Female

Summary:

Martha Lynne Butler (“Plaintiff”) worked for Coca-Cola (“Defendant”), under the supervision of Yu Shi (“Defendant Shi”). Plaintiff brought numerous claims against Defendants, stemming from facts such as a denial of overtime pay despite working after-hours at Yu Shi’s direction, solely because Defendant Shi did not trust Black people and therefore, she did not trust that Plaintiff was doing the work.

The magistrate judge recommended the Court grant summary judgment for Defendant on all but three claims: Title VII disparate treatment (related to the denial of her overtime pay), FLSA overtime pay, and Title VII punitive damages (related to the denial of her overtime pay). Defendant objected to the Report, but the Court ultimately found Yu Shi’s comments to be direct evidence, Plaintiff’s memory of work she did was sufficient to serve as evidence of compensable time, and Defendant had notice of her overtime claim because Yu Shi, an individual high up in the company, both had her work late and deny her overtime.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: DABNEY V. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Nature of the Order: Final Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge: Walter E. Johnson

District Judge: Charles A. Pannell Jr.

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Hostile Work Environment (Title VII – race, color, sex and protected activity)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
2. Claim: Discrimination (race, color, and sex – denial of promotion, issued a letter, and investigated)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended
3. Claim: Retaliation for engaging in protected speech (Title VII)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Recommended

Whether R&R Followed: Granted in part, denied in part

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: African American

Gender of Plaintiff: Male

Summary:

Patrick Dabney (“Plaintiff”) began working for the Transportation Security Administration (“Defendant”), which is a component of the DHS, at its Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (“OLE/FAMS” or “FAMS”) in the Atlanta Field Office (“AFO”) in 2002; he has been a Supervisory Federal Air Marshal (“SFAM)” since 2008. After a panel reviewed applicants including Plaintiff for a promotion, and unanimously voted to give the promotion to a Caucasian applicant, and Defendant investigated Plaintiff after receiving an anonymous letter alleging Plaintiff sexually harassed women in his field office, Plaintiff brought three claims against Defendant.

The magistrate judge recommended summary judgment for all three claims. Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim was insufficient because Plaintiff did not point to any severe or pervasive conduct that altered the terms or conditions of his employment. Nor did Plaintiff offer evidence to show that Plaintiff had been harmed, certainly none that would dissuade Plaintiff from making an EEOC complaint, and therefore, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was insufficiently unsupported. Finally, his race/color discrimination claims failed because he did not offer sufficient evidence to show that no reasonable person could have chosen Punchard or Bishop over him, he did not offer a similarly-situated TSA employee outside his protected class against whom anonymous allegations were made who was not investigated, and there was no evidence suggesting that Plaintiff’s race or color had anything to do with why the TSA had investigated Plaintiff.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: SWEETING V. HILL ET AL.

Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Report & Recommendation and Denying Summary Judgment

Magistrate Judge: Linda T. Walker

District Judge: J.P. Boulee

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Failure to Accommodate (ADA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
2. Claim: Failure to Accommodate (Rehabilitation Act)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
3. Claim: Retaliation (ADA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
4. Claim: Retaliation (Rehabilitation Act)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
5. Claim: FMLA Interference
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
6. Claim: FMLA Retaliation
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied
7. Claim: Violation of the U.S. Constitution
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Denied

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: N/A

Summary:

Plaintiff Kyetha Sweeting was a correctional officer at the Clayton County Jail.  After a fight with an inmate in August 2017, she suffered from severe migraines.  Throughout the remainder of 2017 and 2018, she either took intermittent FMLA leave or requested – and received – a series of assignments to job duties that accommodated her migraines.  However, when she requested limited hours and an assignment that limited her contact with inmates in December 2018, her supervisor required a fitness-for-duty certification.  Plaintiff’s doctor provided a note that, with leave, her condition was expected to markedly improve within one month, such that she could then perform her job duties.  Plaintiff told HR on January 3 that she would request further FMLA leave when she became eligible on January 23.  However, Defendant terminated her four days later on the grounds that she could no longer perform the essential duties of her job.  After her termination, Sweeting filed suit against Defendant, alleging failure to accommodate and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act & the Rehabilitation Act, interference and retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, and constitutional violations unrelated to her employment.

Defendant filed for summary judgment on all claims, but Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker recommended denying Defendant’s motion.  Defendant made several objections to Judge Walker’s recommendation, but District Judge J.P. Boulee upheld the recommendation.  For instance, Defendant objected that the Magistrate made no finding as to the essential functions of the job, but Judge Boulee held that, even if Defendant was right about what those functions were, Plaintiff’s doctor had stated that she would be able to perform them after a month of leave.  Defendant objected that Plaintiff had requested indefinite leave, which is not a reasonable accommodation under the law.  But Judge Boulee held that the request was only for a month, not indefinite.  Defendant argued it was not reasonable to prevent all contact with inmates at a jail, but Judge Boulee noted Plaintiff only requested “limited” contact with inmates, and a previous assignment in the medical unit control tower accomplished such limited contact.  Finally, as to the FMLA claims, Judge Boulee noted that Defendant failed to address the close temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s leave request and the termination, or an admission by Defendant’s witness that Plaintiff’s decision to take leave contributed to her termination.  For these reasons, Judge Boulee denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: TAYLOR V. BENKESER

Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge: Regina D. Cannon

District Judge: Amy Totenberg

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claims: Title VII Race Discrimination and Retaliation
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
2. Claims: Section 1983: Section 1981, Equal Protection Clause, First Amendment
   • Outcomes: Summary Judgment Granted
3. Claims: Georgia State Law Claims: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted

Whether R&R Followed: Yes.

For Race Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: African American

Summary:

The Court adopted the Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation. No objections were filed to the R&R.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.

CASE NAME: WALDERA V. MARKETSOURCE, INC.

Nature of the Order: Order Adopting the Report & Recommendation and Granting Summary Judgment

Magistrate Judge: John K. Larkins III

District Judge: Timothy C. Batten, Sr.

Claims & Outcomes:

1. Claim: Pay Discrimination Based on Sex (EPA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
2. Claim: Pay Discrimination Based on Sex (Title VII)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
3. Claim: Retaliation (EPA)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted
4. Claim: Retaliation (Title VII)
   • Outcome: Summary Judgment Granted

Whether R&R Followed: Yes

For Race/Gender Discrimination Cases:

            Race of Plaintiff: N/A

Gender of Plaintiff: Female

Summary:

Plaintiff Lindsey Waldera was promoted to the position of Operations Director for the Target Tech program of Defendant MarketSource, Inc.  However, she was dismayed to find out that she was being paid significantly less than her predecessor in that position and the other Operations Director (both of whom were men).  Waldera complained of sex discrimination in pay to her supervisor on several occasions.  Several months later, Waldera learned she would be transferred to a new role in which she would supervise more people, but would only be offered a $3,500 pay increase.  Waldera resigned, stating that she was being under-compensated.  Afterward, Waldera filed suit against MarketSource, alleging sex-based pay discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.

MarketSource moved for summary judgment on all claims and Magistrate Judge John K. Larkins III recommended granting the company’s motion.  Plaintiff objected to the recommendation, but was overruled by Chief District Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr.  Judge Batten found that Waldera’s predecessor and fellow Operations Director were not proper comparators under the EPA because they had significantly different job responsibilities, despite having the same job title.  This defeated the pay discrimination claim.  As to the retaliation claim, Judge Batten found that Waldera had not suffered an adverse action.  The pay increase accompanying her transfer, while less than expected, was not a violation of her rights because Waldera was not entitled to expect or rely on a pay raise of a certain size.  For these reasons, Judge Batten granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

To read the full analysis, click here.

For a copy of the complete order, click here.